2-Valued and 3-Valued Abstraction-Refinement in Model Checking by Orna Grumberg
2-Valued and 3-Valued
Abstraction-Renement in Model
Checking
Orna GRUMBERG
Computer Science Department, Technion,
Haifa, Israel
Abstract.
This paper presents two frameworks for abstraction-renement in
model checking. The rst is the CounterExample-Guided Abstraction-
Renement (CEGAR) which can verify universal fragments of temporal
logics and is based on a 2-valued semantics of temporal logics . The
other is the Three-valued Abstraction-Renement (TVAR) and is based
on a 3-valued semantics of these logics.
We also present an application of the 3-valued framework for fully au-
tomatic compositional model checking. Based on this and other success-
ful applications of the 3-valued framework we conclude that the addi-
tional power it provides is worth the extra eorts of having non-standard
denitions and algorithms.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present two frameworks for abstraction-renement in model
checking, based on two dierent semantics for temporal logics: The 2-valued and
the 3-valued semantics. We then show how to exploit the 3-valued framework for
compositional model checking.
Model checking [10] is an ecient procedure for automatic system verication.
Given a nite-state model of a system and a desired property, it checks whether
the system satises the property. Model checking is widely used for hardware
and for software verication. Its main limitation, however, is the state explosion
problem which refers to its high memory requirements.
One of the most useful approaches to ghting the state explosion problem
is abstraction. Abstraction hides some of the system details that are considered
irrelevant for the checked property. An abstract model is then constructed in a way
which guarantees preservation of the checked property. That is, from the truth
value of the property on the abstract model we can conclude its truth value on the
full (concrete) model of the system. The abstract model is usually signicantlysmaller in size (i.e., number of states and transitions) than the concrete model,
making the application of model checking to it more feasible1.
It sometimes happen that too many system details are eliminated via abstrac-
tion and as a result, the property cannot be correctly evaluated on the abstract
model. In that case, a renement is needed in order to add more system details
into the model, thus making it closer to the concrete model.
The most widely used abstraction-renement framework is based on the 2-
valued (standard) semantics of temporal logics. The abstract model in this case is
an over-approximation of the concrete model, meaning that it has more behaviors
(but still less states and transitions). Such abstractions preserve the validity of
properties in the universal fragment of temporal logics, but do not preserve their
falsity. Thus, it is possible that a property is refuted on the abstract model, but
the counterexample which demonstrates a bad abstract behavior do not have a
corresponding counterexample in the concrete model. Such counterexamples are
called spurious. If spurious counterexamples are identied, a renement is applied,
in order to eliminate them. This framework is called CounterExample-Guided
Abstraction-Renement (CEGAR) [9].
A dierent framework for abstraction-renement is based on the 3-valued
semantics of temporal logics. The abstract model here both over-approximates
and under-approximates the concrete model. It preserves both validity and falsity
of full temporal logics. However, a property may also be evaluated to a third
indenite truth value (sometimes denoted ?), which indicates that the abstraction
is too coarse. In this case, renement is aimed at eliminating the indenite result.
This framework is called Three-Valued Abstraction-Renement(TVAR) [35,36].
The advantage of the 2-valued framework is that abstract models are of the
same form as concrete models (Kripke structures). Thus, semantics with respect to
abstract model is dened in the standard way. Further, standard model checking
algorithms can be applied in order to check properties on these models.
In contrast, the 3-valued semantics of temporal logics is dened with respect
to dierent types of models (KMTSs). The semantics is dened dierently and
special-purpose model checking is required. Yet, the main advantage of TVAR is
its ability to both verify and falsify a signicantly more expressive specication
language (the full temporal logics rather than just their universal fragment). Fur-
ther, as we show next, TVAR provides a dierent perspective on system modeling
and checking and thus enabling to develop new verication methodologies.
Another useful approach for ghting the state explosion problem is composi-
tional model checking. In compositional model checking one tries to verify parts
of the system separately in order to avoid the construction of the entire system.
To account for the dependencies between the components, the Assume-Guarantee
(AG) paradigm [27,33] suggests how to verify one module based on an assump-
tion about the behavior of its environment, where the environment consists of
the other system modules. The environment is then veried, in order to guar-
antee that it actually satises the assumption. Many of the works on composi-
tional model checking are based on the Assume-Guarantee (AG) paradigm and
1Abstraction can also transform an innite-state system into a (small) nite abstract model.on learning [13,2,1,5]. These works are all designed for universal safety properties
with the exception of [16], which learns the full class of !-regular languages2.
In this paper we present an alternative solution to compositional model check-
ing, based on the work in [38]. We exploit the power of the 3-valued abstraction
in order to provide a fully automatic compositional technique that can determine
the truth values of full temporal logics with respect to a given system. Our goal
is to verify a system M composed of several components without ever fully con-
structing M. For that we view each component Mi of M as a 3-valued abstrac-
tion of M. If the checked property ' is evaluated to True or False on Mi then
we can conclude that this is indeed the truth value of ' on M. If, however, '
is evaluated to the indenite value on all components, then only the parts of the
components that are relevant to the indenite result are composed and checked.
Thus the construction of the full model is avoided.
Other applications of 3-valued (and multi-valued) abstractions has been ap-
plied successfully in dierent contexts (see Conclusion for more details). We thus
conclude that the additional power of the 3-valued framework is worth the extra
eorts of having non-standard denitions and algorithms.
2-Valued Abstraction and Renement
2. Basic Denitions
We start by presenting the logic that will be used for specication. We describe
the logic -calculus [28], which is highly expressive. Widely used temporal logics
such as LTL, CTL and CTL [10] can be expressed within this logic.
The -calculus
Let AP be a nite set of atomic propositions and V a set of propositional variables.
We dene the set of literals over AP to be Lit = AP [f:p : p 2 APg. We identify
::p with p. The logic -calculus [28] in negation normal form over AP is dened
by:
' ::= l j Z j ' ^ ' j ' _ ' j 2' j }' j Z:' j Z:'
where l 2 Lit and Z 2 V. Intuitively, 2 stands for \all successors", and }
stands for \exists a successor".  denotes the least xpoint, whereas  denotes the
greatest xpoint. We will also write  for either  or . Let L denote the set of
closed formulas generated by the above grammar, where the xpoint quantiers
 and  are variable binders. We assume that formulas are well-named, i.e. no
variable is bound more than once in any formula. Thus, every variable Z identies
a unique subformula fp(Z) = Z:  of ', where the set Sub(') of subformulas of
' is dened in the usual way.
2!-regular languages can express both safety and liveness, but are still universal in essence,
i.e., no existential properties can be describedA useful sub-logic of the -calculus is its universal fragment, denoted 8L, in
which the operator } is not allowed. Specication written in this fragment can
describe a property that holds for all behaviors of the system, but cannot specify
a property of a specic behavior. On the other hand, both safety and liveness
properties can be described. Safety properties are usually described by means of
greatest xpoints while liveness properties are given by least xpoints.
As an example of properties written in 8L, consider the safety property
\along all execution paths of the system and in every state on the path, p holds",
for atomic proposition p (writen in CTL [10] as AGp). This property can be
written by the 8L formula
Z(p ^ 2Z):
The liveness property \Along every execution path eventually p holds" (written
in CTL as AFp) will be written by the 8L formula
Z(p _ 2Z):
In the context of model checking, systems are typically modelled as Kripke struc-
tures [10]. For simplicity, we will assume Kripke structures with a single initial
state. Most of the denitions and results described here are presented in the
relevant works for Kripke structures with multiple initial states.
Denition 2.1 (Kripke structures) A Kripke structure M = (AP;S;s0;R;L) is
a tuple where AP is a nite set of atomic propositions, S is a nite set of states,
s0 2 S is the initial state, R  S  S is a transition relation3, and L : S ! 2Lit
is a labeling function, such that for every state s and every p 2 AP, exactly one
of p and :p is in L(s).
The concrete semantics [[']]
M of a closed formula ' 2 L over AP w.r.t. a Kripke
structure M = (AP;S;s0;R;L) is a mapping from S to ftt;g. [[']]
M(s) = tt
(= ) means that the formula ' is true (false) in the state s of the Kripke
structure M. If [[']]
M(s0) = tt (= ), we say that M satises (falsies) ', denoted
M j= ' (M 6j= '). For the full denition of the concrete semantics of -calculus,
see [28,10].
Simulation Relation
Next, we dene a preorder over Kripke structures, called the simulation rela-
tion [32]. Intuitively, if structure M2 is greater by the simulation relation than
structure M1 then M2 has more behaviors than M1. Universal properties charac-
terize all behaviors of the model, thus every universal property that holds on M2
also holds on M1.
3For temporal logics the transition relation is usually required to be total. This makes the
denition of their semantics simpler and also simplies the denition of simulation relations.
For -calculus this requirement is not needed.We will later show how to exploit the simulation relation in model checking:
Instead of checking the concrete (full) model of a system we will check an abstract
model that has more behaviors but less states and transitions. Thus, applying
model checking to it is easier. By the preservation theorem for simulation pre-
sented below, we will be able to conclude that every property that is true on the
abstract model is also true on the concrete model (the opposite, however, is not
necessarily true).
Simulation between two models is checked state-wise: One state is smaller
than another by the simulation relation if they are identically labeled and for every
successor of the smaller state there is a corresponding successor of the greater
one. Formally, let M1 = (AP;S1;s0
1;R1;L1) and M2 = (AP;S2;s0
2;R2;L2) be two
Kripke structures over AP.
Denition 2.2 (Simulation relation) A relation H  S1  S2 is a simulation re-
lation [32] over M1 and M2 if the following conditions hold:
1. The initial states are related. That is, H(s0
1;s0
2).
2. For every s1, s2 such that H(s1;s2),
 L1(s1) = L2(s2) and
 8t1[ R1(s1;t1)  ! 9t2[ R2(s2;t2) ^ H(t1;t2) ]].
We write s1  s2 for H(s1;s2). M2 simulates M1 (denoted M1  M2) if there
exists a simulation relation H over M1 and M2.
The following theorem states the preservation of 8L formulas. Clearly, the
same preservation holds also for LTL and for the universal fragments of CTL and
CTL [21].
Theorem 2.3 [31] Let M1  M2. Then for every 8L formula ' with atomic
propositions in AP, M2 j= ' implies M1 j= '. Further, if s1  s2 then
[[']]
M2(s2) = tt implies [[']]
M1(s1) = tt.
Abstraction Mappings
We consider abstractions that collapse sets of concrete states into single abstract
states. Let M be a Kripke structure over a set of states S. Given a set of abstract
states b S, the concretization function  : b S ! 2S indicates, for each abstract state
b s, the set of concrete states represented by b s.
Such abstractions can be described in the framework of Abstract Interpreta-
tion [14,31,15].
3. Abstract Models
In this section we dene an abstraction which is suitable for reasoning about
universal logics, such as 8L. The abstract model (Kripke structure) is dened
with respect to a given concrete one. It is guaranteed by construction to be greater
by the simulation relation than the concrete model, thus preservation of universal
logics is guaranteed. In practice, however, the concrete model is too large to t intoc M
M
Figure 1. Existential Abstraction. M is the original Kripke structure, and c M the abstracted
one. The dotted lines in M indicate how the states of M are clustered into abstract states.
memory and therefore is never produced. The abstract models are constructed
directly from some high-level description of the system.
3.1. Existential Abstraction
We dene abstract Kripke structures by means of existential abstraction [8]. Ex-
istential abstraction denes an abstract state to be an initial state if it represents
an initial concrete state. Similarly, there is a transition from abstract state b s to
abstract state b s0 if there is a transition from a state represented by b s to a state
represented by b s0. An abstract model constructed by means of an existential ab-
straction is an over-approximation of the concrete model in the sense that ev-
ery behavior of the concrete model has a corresponding behavior in the abstract
model, but the abstract model may also contain additional behaviors. Formally,
Denition 3.1 (Abstract Kripke structure) Let M = (AP;S;S0;R;L) be a (con-
crete) Kripke structure, let b S be a set of abstract states and  : b S ! 2S be
a concretization function. The abstract Kripke structure c M = (AP; b S; c S0; b R; b L)
generated by  for M is dened as follows:
1. c S0(b s) i 9s(s 2 (b s) ^ S0(s)).
2. b R(b s1; b s2) i 9s19s2 (s1 2 (b s1) ^ s2 2 (b s2) ^ R(s1;s2)).
3. b L(b s) =
T
s2(b s) L(s).
Having `i' in items 1 and 2 of the denition above results in the exact
abstract model of M, with respect to . Replacing `i' by `if' results in a model
with more initial states and more transitions, which still over-approximates the
structure M. Such a model is sometimes easier to construct. The results below
hold for any abstract Kripke structure constructed by existential abstraction, not
only for the exact one.
Note that, an abstract state b s is labeled by a literal p if and only if all the
states it represents are labeled by that literal. Since every concrete state is labeledby exactly one of p and :p, b s will be labeled by at most one of p and :p. However,
it might not be labeled by either of them. To avoid this we introduce an additional
condition requiring that all concrete states, represented by the same abstract
state, are identically labeled.
We say that a concretization function  is appropriate for AP if for every
abstract state b s and every s1;s2 2 (b s), L(s1) = L(s2). In that case we also obtain
that b L(b s) = L(s) for every s 2 (b s) . With the appropriateness requirement, the
resulting abstract model is a standard Kripke structure, thus standard semantics
for the logic can be used and standard model checking algorithms can be applied
to abstract models.
In section 5, we will consider 3-valued abstraction where the value of a literal
on an abstract state may be indenite.
As an example of a concrete and abstract models, consider a (part of a)
model M described in the lower part of Figure 1. The dotted lines describe the
partition of the concrete states into sets, each represented by an abstract state in
c M. The initial state and transitions in c M are dened according to the existential
abstraction. Note that c M contains self loops indicating the possibility to stay
forever in the same state. Such behaviors are not included in M. This exemplies
the fact that c M is an over-approximation of M.
The following theorem and corollary state that for 8L, properties which are
correct for c M are correct for M as well.
Theorem 3.2 [8] Let M be a Kripke structure and ' be a 8L formula, both
dened over AP. Further, let  be appropriate for AP and c M be an abstract model
generated by  for M. Then M  c M.
By the above theorem and by Theorem 2.3 we get:
Corollary 3.3 Let M and c M be as above. Then [[']]
c M = tt implies [[']]
M = tt.
Note that once b S, , and AP are given, c S0, b R, and b L are uniquely deter-
mined. Thus, b S, , and AP uniquely determine c M. Since  implicitly includes
the information about b S and AP, we sometimes refer to  for identifying c M.
Several types of abstractions based on existential abstraction are dened and
used. The most commonly used are the localization reduction [29] for hardware
verication and predicate abstraction [19] for software verication. The abstrac-
tions dier in their choice of abstract states and the concretization function.
Localization reduction distinguishes between visible and invisible variables,
where only the visible variables are considered to be relevant for the checked
property. The abstract states are dened to be all valuation of the visible variables.
 mapped each abstract state to the set of concrete states that agree with it on
the valuation of the visible variables (while they may dier in their valuation of
the invisible variables). Usually, the visible variables are also chosen as the set of
atomic propositions AP.
Predicate abstraction chooses a set of predicates over the program variables.
Abstract states correspond to possible valuations of these predicates. An abstractred green yellow d red c go
Figure 2. Abstraction of a US trac light.
state represents all those concrete states which agree with it on the valuation of
the predicates. The predicates are also used as the atomic propositions in AP.
As mentioned before, once b S, , and AP are chosen, the abstract model
dened by means of existential abstraction is uniquely determined. Other types
of abstractions can also be found in the literature. A more detailed description of
the abstractions mentioned above can be found in [22].
4. CounterExample-Guided Abstraction Renement (CEGAR)
It is easy to see that, regardless of the type of abstraction we use, the abstract
model c M contains less information than the concrete model M4. Thus, model
checking the structure c M potentially produces incorrect results. Corollary 3.3
guarantees that if an 8L specication is true in c M then it is also true in M. On
the other hand, the following example shows that if the abstract model invalidates
an 8L specication, the actual model may still satisfy the specication.
Example 4.1 The US trac light controller M, presented on the left-hand side
of Figure 2, contains three states, red;green, and yellow. It is dened over the set
of atomic propositions AP = f(state = red)g, where L(red) = f(state = red)g
and L(green) = L(yellow) = f:(state = red)g . We would like to prove for
M the property \along every path, innitely often (state = red) holds". This
can be written in CTL as   = AGAF(state = red). The set of abstract
states is fd red; b gog, where (d red) = fredg and ( b go) = fgreen;yellowg. Clearly,
b L(d red) = f(state = red)g while b L( b go) = f:(state = red)g. It is easy to see that
M j=   while c M 6j=  . There exists an innite abstract trace hd red; b go; b go;:::i that
invalidates the property. However no corresponding concrete trace exists in M.
When an abstract counterexample does not correspond to any concrete coun-
terexample, we call it spurious. For example, hd red; b go; b go;:::i in the above exam-
ple is a spurious counterexample.
Let us consider the situation outlined in Figure 3. We see that the abstract
path, marked by the thick arrows, does not have a corresponding concrete path.
Every concrete path starting at the initial state ends up in state D, from which
we cannot go further. Therefore, D is called a deadend state. On the other hand,
the state B is a bad state, since it made us believe that there is an outgoing
transition. Finally, state I is an irrelevant state since it is neither deadend nor
bad. To eliminate the spurious path, the abstraction can be rened, for instance,
4From now on we will assume that c M is dened according to a concretization function ,
which is appropriate for AP.D
I B
c M
M
Figure 3. The abstract path in c M (indicated by the thick arrows) is spurious. To eliminate the
spurious path, the abstraction has to be rened as indicated by the thick line in M.
as indicated by the thick line, separating deadend states from bad states. These
notions are made precise in the next section.
4.1. The CEGAR Framework
In this section we present the framework of CounterExample-Guided Abstraction-
Renement (CEGAR) [29,9], for universal temporal logics and existential abstrac-
tion. The framework is suitable, in principle, for logics such as 8L, ACTL,
ACTL, and LTL. In practice, however, most model checking tools handle CTL or
LTL. They usually produce a counterexample in the form of a nite path leading
to a state violating the property. Alternatively, they produce a counterexample
in the form of a lasso (nite path leading to a simple cycle), showing a behavior
along which a desired state is never reached. Most CEGAR implementations refer
to these forms of counterexamples.
The main steps of the CEGAR framework are presented below:
1. Given a system P (whose concrete model is M) and a universal temporal
formula ', generate an initial abstract model c M.
This step is typically done by examining a high level description of P.
For software, for instance, we may examine the program text and choose
conditions used in control statements such as if and while as predicates.
Additional predicates will come from the atomic formulas in '.
2. Model check c M with respect to '. If ' is true, then conclude that the
concrete model satises the formula and stop. If a counterexample b T is
found, check whether it is also a counterexample in the concrete model. If
it is, conclude that the concrete model does not satisfy the formula and
stop. Otherwise, the counterexample is spurious. Proceed to step 3.
3. Rene the abstract model, so that b T will not be included in the new,
rened abstract model. Go back to step 2.
Renement is typically done by partitioning an abstract state. By this we
mean that the set of concrete states, represented by the abstract state, ispartitioned. The renement can be accelerated in the cost of faster increase
of the abstract model if the criterion obtained for partitioning one abstract
state (e.g. a new predicate) is used to partition all abstract states.
4.2. A BDD-based Implementation of CEGAR
To exemplify one possible implementation of CEGAR, we follow [9], and present
a BDD-based implementation of the CEGAR framework. In this implementation
the abstract models and the renements are computed and represented symboli-
cally, using BDDs [4]. Such an implementation is feasible only when the concrete
model of the system under consideration is nite and only moderately large.
Other CEGAR implementations are based on SAT-solvers or theorem provers.
Depending on the type of  and the size of M, the initial abstract model (i.e.,
abstract initial states and abstract transitions) can be built using BDDs, SAT
solvers or theorem provers. Similarly, the partitioning of abstract states, per-
formed in the renement, can be done using BDDs (e.g. as in [9]), SAT solvers
(e.g. as in [6]), or linear programming and machine learning (e.g. as in [11]).
We use standard BDD-based symbolic model checking procedures to deter-
mine whether c M satises the property '. If it does, then by Corollary 3.3 we con-
clude that the original Kripke structure also satises '. Otherwise, assume that
the model checker produces a counterexample b T corresponding to the abstract
model c M. In the rest of this section, we will focus on counterexamples which are
nite paths. In [9], counterexamples consisting of a nite path followed by a loop
(lasso) are also considered. In [12], tree-like counterexamples for all of ACTL are
considered.
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Figure 4. An abstract counterexample, which is spurious
4.2.1. Identifying Spurious Path Counterexamples
Assume the counterexample b T is a path hb s1; ;c sni starting at the initial abstract
state b s1. We extend the concretization function  to sequence of abstract states
in the following way: (b T) is the set of concrete paths dened as follows:
(b T) = fhs1; ;snij
n ^
i=1
si 2 (b si) ^ S0(s1) ^
n 1 ^
i=1
R(si;si+1)g:Next, we give a symbolic algorithm to compute a sequence of sets of states that
correspond to (b T). Let S1 = (b s1) \ S0. For 1 < i  n, we dene Si in the
following manner: Si := Image(Si 1) \ (b si), where, Image(Si 1) is the set of
successors of states in Si 1. The sequence of sets Si is computed symbolically
using BDDs and the standard image computation algorithm. The following lemma
establishes the correctness of this procedure.
Lemma 4.1 The following are equivalent:
1. The path b T corresponds to a concrete counterexample.
2. The set of concrete paths (b T) is non-empty.
3. For all 1  i  n, Si 6= ;.
Suppose that condition (3) of Lemma 4.1 is violated, and let i be the largest
index such that Si 6= ;. Then b si is called the failure state of the spurious coun-
terexample b T. It follows from Lemma 4.1 that if (b T) is empty (i.e., if the coun-
terexample b T is spurious), then there exists a minimal i (1  i  n) such that
Si = ;.
Example 4.2 Consider a program with only one variable with domain D =
f1; ;12g. Assume that the concretization function is shown in Figure 4 by the
dotted lines from b S = fb 1;b 2;b 3;b 4g. Suppose that we obtain an abstract counterex-
ample b T = hb 1;b 2;b 3;b 4i. It is easy to see that b T is spurious. Using the terminology
of Lemma 4.1, we have S1 = f1;2;3g, S2 = f4;5;6g, S3 = f9g, and S4 = ;.
Notice that S4 is empty. Thus, b s3 is the failure state.
Algorithm SplitPATH(b T)
S := (b s1) \ S0
j := 1
while (S 6= ; and j < n) f
j := j + 1
Sprev := S
S := Image(S) \ (b sj) g
if S 6= ; then output "counterexample exists"
else output j   1, Sprev
Figure 5. SplitPATH checks if an abstract path is spurious.
The symbolic Algorithm SplitPATH in Figure 5 obtains an abstract coun-
terexample b T = hb s1;:::;c sni and computes the index of the failure state and the
set of states Si 1; the states in Si 1 are called deadend states. After the de-
tection of the deadend states, we proceed to the renement step. On the other
hand, if none of the Si sets is empty then SplitPATH will report that a \real"
counterexample exists and we can stop.4.2.2. Rening the Abstraction
We now explain how to rene an abstraction to eliminate a given spurious coun-
terexample. In order to simplify the discussion we assume that the abstract model
is exact (see the discussion following Denition 3.1). Abstract models with addi-
tional transitions and initial states can also be handled (see e.g. [26]). Recall the
discussion concerning Figure 3 in Section 4 where we identied deadend states,
bad states, and irrelevant states. The renement should suggest a partitioning of
abstract states, that will separate the deadend states SD from the bad states SB.
We already have the deadend states. SD is exactly the set Sprev, returned
by the algorithm SplitPATH. The algorithm also returns j   1, the index in
the counterexample where the failure state has been encountered. We can now
compute the bad states symbolically as follows:
SB = PreImage(( d sj+1)) \ (b sj);
where PreImage computes the set of predecessors of the states in ( d sj+1).
(b sj) should now be partitioned to separate between SD and SB. This can
be done in dierent ways. For example, if we work directly with BDDs, then we
can add a new abstract state b s0
j to b S and update the BDD for  so that states in
SD are now mapped to the new state b sj
0. Of course, now b R, c S0 and b L should be
updated.
Our renement procedure continues to rene the abstraction by partitioning
abstract states until a real counterexample is found, or the property is veried.
Since we assume that the concrete model is nite, the partitioning procedure is
guaranteed to terminate.
It should be noted that checking whether a counterexample is spurious and
then nding a splitting criterion involves computations on the concrete structure.
These computations, however, are usually easier than applying model checking
to the concrete structure. This is because they refer to the part of it which is
relevant to the counterexample. This is why BDD-based CEGAR is feasible only
when the concrete model M is nite and only moderately large.
3-Valued Abstraction and Renement
5. Abstract models and Mixed Simulation
In the previous sections we dealt with an abstraction which over-approximates
the concrete model of the system. As seen there, such an abstraction can be used
for verifying properties written in the universal fragment of the -calculus, but
not for refuting such properties. In this section we present a dierent type of
abstraction, the 3-valued abstraction, which can be used for both verication and
falsication of the full -calculus.
Abstract models preserving the full -calculus need to have two types of
transitions [30,15]: The concrete transitions are over-approximated by the may
transitions and under-approximated by the must transitions. This is achieved by
using Kripke Modal Transition Systems [25,17] as abstract models.Denition 5.1 A Kripke Modal Transition System (KMTS) is a tuple M =
(AP;S;s0;R+;R ;L), where S is a nite set of states, s0 2 S is an initial state,
R+  S  S and R   S  S are transition relations such that R+  R , and
L : S ! 2Lit is a labeling function, s.t. for each state s and p 2 AP, at most one
of p and :p is in L(s).
The 3-valued semantics [[']]
M
3 of a closed formula ' 2 L w.r.t. a KMTS M
is a mapping from S to ftt;;?g [3,25]. The interesting cases in the denition of
the 3-valued semantics are those of the literals and the modalities.
[[l]]
M
3 (s) = tt if l 2 L(s);  if :l 2 L(s); ? otherwise:
[[2 ]]
M
3 (s) =
8
<
:
tt; if 8t 2 S; if R (s;t) then [[ ]]
M
3 (t) = tt
; if 9t 2 S s.t. R+(s;t) and [[ ]]
M
3 (t) = 
?; otherwise
and dually for }  when exchanging tt and . The notations M j= ' and M 6j= '
are used for KMTSs as well. In addition, if [[']]
M
3 (s0) =?, the value of ' in M is
indenite.
The following denition formalizes the relation between two KMTSs that
guarantees preservation of -calculus formulas w.r.t. the 3-valued semantics.
Denition 5.2 (Mixed Simulation) [15,17] Let M1 = (AP;S1;s0
1;R
+
1 ;R
 
1 ;L1)
and M2 = (AP;S2;s0
2;R
+
2 ;R
 
2 ;L2) be two KMTSs, both dened over AP. b H 
S1  S2 is a mixed simulation from M1 to M2 if b H(s1;s2) implies:
1. L2(s2)  L1(s1).
2. if R
 
1 (s1;s0
1), then there is some s0
2 2 S2 such that R
 
2 (s2;s0
2) and
b H(s0
1;s0
2).
3. if R
+
2 (s2;s0
2), then there is some s0
1 2 S1 such that R
+
1 (s1;s0
1) and
b H(s0
1;s0
2).
If there is a mixed simulation b H such that (s0
1;s0
2) 2 b H, then M2 abstracts M1,
denoted M1  M2.
In particular, Denition 5.2 can be applied to a (concrete) Kripke structure M
and an (abstract) KMTS c M, by viewing the Kripke structure as a KMTS where
R+ = R  = R. For a Kripke structure, the 3-valued semantics agrees with
the concrete semantics. Thus, preservation of L formulas is guaranteed by the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 [17] Let b H  S1S2 be the mixed simulation relation from a KMTS
M1 to a KMTS M2. Then for every b H(s1;s2) and every ' 2 L we have that
[[']]
M2
3 (s2) 6=? ) [[']]
M1
3 (s1) = [[']]
M2
3 (s2).
Given a concrete model M = (AP;S;s0;R;L), an abstract model c M can then
be dened as follows. b s0 is the initial abstract state i s0 2 (b s0). An abstract states` 0 _  1
s` i
: i 2 f0;1g s`} 
t`  : sR+t or sR t s`Z: 
s`Z
s` 0 ^  1
s` i
: i 2 f0;1g s`2 
t`  : sR+t or sR t s`Z
s`  : if fp(Z) = Z: 
Figure 6. The rules of the model checking game for L.
b s is labeled by l 2 Lit only if all the concrete states that it represents are labeled
by l. Thus, it is possible that neither p nor :p are in b L(b s). The may-transitions are
computed such that they represent (at least) every concrete transition: if 9s 2 (b s)
and 9s0 2 (b s0) such that R(s;s0), then R (b s;b s0). The must-transitions represent
concrete transitions that are common to all the concrete states represented by the
origin abstract state: R+(b s;b s0) only if 8s 2 (b s) 9s0 2 (b s0) such that R(s;s0).
Other constructions of abstract models, based on Galois connections, can be found
in [15,18].
The relation b H 2 S  b S, which is dened by (s;b s) 2 b H i s 2 (b s), then
forms a mixed simulation [15,17] from M to the resulting abstract model c M. By
the above theorem we thus have that every L formula which has a denite truth
value (tt or ) in the abstract KMTS c M has the same truth value in the concrete
Kripke structure M as well.
6. 3-Valued Model Checking
A 3-valued game-based model checking for the -calculus over KMTSs was sug-
gested in [20,23]. They introduce 3-valued parity games and translate the 3-valued
model checking problem into the problem of determining the winner in a 3-valued
satisfaction game, which is a special case of a 3-valued parity game. We omit the
details of the 3-valued satisfaction game, but continue with the game graph, which
presents all the information \relevant" for the model checking.
Let M = (AP;S;s0;R+;R ;L) be a KMTS and ' 2 L. The game graph
GM', or in short G, is a graph (N;n0;E+;E ) where N  S  Sub(') is a
set of nodes and E+  E   N  N are sets of must and may edges dened
as follows. n0 = s0 ` ' 2N is the initial node. The (rest of the) nodes and the
edges are dened by the rules of Figure 6, with the meaning that whenever n 2 N
is of the form of the upper part of the rule, the result in the lower part of the
rule is also a node n0 2N and E (n;n0). Moreover, E+(n;n0) holds as well in all
cases except for an application of the rules in the second column with a model's
transition (s;t) 2 R  n R+. Intuitively, the outgoing edges of s `   2 N dene
\subgoals" for checking   in s.
If E (n;n0) (E+(n;n0)) then n0 is a may (must) son of n. A node n = s` 
in GM' is classied as a ^, _, 2, } node, based on  . If   is of the form Z or
Z: 0, n is deterministic { it has exactly one son. If n has no outgoing edges, then
it is a terminal node. In a full game graph this means that either   is a literal, or
  is of the form } 0 or 2 0, and s has no outgoing transition in M.Figure 7(b) presents examples of game graphs for ' = 2(:i_}o) (written in
CTL as AX(:i _ EXo) ) and the models from Figure 7(a), where all transitions
are considered may transitions.
The model checking algorithms of [20,23] can be viewed as coloring algorithms
that label (color) each node n = s `   in the game graph by T, F, ? depending
on the truth value of   in the state s in M (based on the 3-valued semantics).
The result of the coloring is a 3-valued coloring function  : N ! fT;F;?g.
The following formalizes the correctness of the coloring. For a (possibly not
closed) formula  ,   denotes the result of replacing every free occurrence of
Z 2 V in   by fp(Z). Note that   is a closed formula. Further note that if   is
closed, then   =  .
Denition 6.1 Let GM' be a game graph for a KMTS M and ' 2 L. A (pos-
sibly partial) coloring function  : N ! fT;F;?g for GM' (or its subgraph) is
correct if for every s`  2 N, whenever (s` ) is dened, then:
1. [[ ]]
M
3 (s) = tt i (s` ) = T.
2. [[ ]]
M
3 (s) =  i (s` ) = F.
3. [[ ]]
M
3 (s) =? i (s` ) =?.
Theorem 6.2 [20,23] Let F be the (total) coloring function returned by the col-
oring algorithm of [20] or [23] for GM'. Then F is correct.
The nal coloring of the nodes reects the 3-valued semantics of the logic:
A ^-node or a 2-node is colored T i all its may sons are colored T (and in
particular if it has no may sons), it is colored F i it has a must son which is
colored F, and otherwise it is colored ?. Dually for a _-node or a }-node when
exchanging T and F. The color of s`l for l 2 Lit is T i l 2 L(s), F i :l 2 L(s),
and ? otherwise. The result of the coloring is demonstrated in Figure 7(b).
Renement
If the result of model checking on an abstract model is indenite (?), a renement
is needed. When using the coloring algorithms of [20,23], an indenite result is
accompanied with a failure state and a failure cause. The failure cause is either a
literal whose value in the failure state is ?, or an outgoing may transition of the
failure state in the underlying model which is not a must transition. Renement
is then performed by splitting the abstract states in a way that eliminates the
failure cause (see [20,23]).
As an example, consider the game graph G1 of Figure 7. The node s0 ` :i
is colored by ? because the value of :i in s0 is indenite. Thus, s0 is a failure
node and i is the cause. A renement will split (b s0) to separate concrete states
in which i is true from those in which :i is true.
The state s1 is also a failure state for G1. This is because the node s1 ` }o
is colored ?. The reason for ? is the may transition going from s1 to s2, where
o is true. Renement will thus split the states in (b s1) to those from which there
is a (concrete) transition to a state in (b s2) and those that do not have such a
transition.7. Compositional Model Checking and 3-Valued Abstraction Join Forces
In the coming sections we will present an application of 3-valued abstraction to
compositional model checking, based on [38].
7.1. Partial Coloring and Subgraphs
In the following sections we use the game-based model checking in order to identify
and focus on the places where the dependencies between components of the system
aect the model checking result. In this section we set the basis for this, by
investigating properties of the game graph and the coloring algorithms.
The coloring algorithms of [20,23] have the important property that they
can be applied on a partially colored graph, in which case they extend the given
coloring to the rest of the graph in a correct way. Moreover, the coloring can also
be applied on a partially colored subgraph, and under certain assumptions it will
yield a correct coloring of the subgraph. To formalize this, we need the following
denitions.
Denition 7.1 Let G be a game graph and F its nal coloring function. For a
non-terminal node n in G we dene its witnessing sons as follows, depending on
its type:
^;2: the witnessing sons are those colored F or ? by F.
_;}: the witnessing sons are those colored T or ? by F.
deterministic: the witnessing son is the only son.
The sons are witnessing in the sense that they suce to determine the color
of the node, thus removing the rest of the node's sons from the graph does not
change the result of the coloring. For example, if a ^-node or a 2-node has no
witnessing sons, meaning all its sons are colored T, then we know it should be
colored T, and this is indeed how the coloring algorithms will color the node
when keeping only the witnessing sons. Otherwise, the witnessing sons determine
whether the node should be colored F or ?, thus one can correctly color the node
by considering only them.
Denition 7.2 A subgraph G0 of a game graph G is closed if every node in G0 is
either a terminal node, or all its witnessing sons (and corresp. edges) from G are
also in G0.
Theorem 7.3 Consider a closed subgraph G0 of a game graph G with a partial
coloring function  which is correct and dened over (at least) all the terminal
nodes in G0. Then applying the coloring algorithm of [20] or [23] on G0 with  as
an initial coloring results in a correct coloring of G0.
In fact, for the coloring of the subgraph to be correct, not all the witnessing
sons are needed, as long as there is enough information to explain the correct
coloring of each uncolored node. However, we will see that in our case we will
need all of them, as we will deduce from the game graph of one component tothe game graph of the full system, where some of the nodes will be removed and
for some an indenite color (?) will change into T or F. This means that some of
the witnessing sons will not remain witnessing sons in the game graph of the full
system. Thus, we will not be able to know a-priori which of them is the \right"
choice to include in a way that will also provide the necessary information for a
correct coloring in the game graph of the full system.
Another notion that we will need later is the following.
Denition 7.4 (?-Subgraph) Let G be a colored graph whose initial node is colored
?. The ?-subgraph is the least subgraph G? of G that obeys the following:
 the initial node is in G? (and is the initial node of G?).
 For each node in G? which is colored ? in G all its witnessing sons (and
corresponding edges) in G are included in G?.
G? is accompanied with a partial coloring function I which is dened over
the terminal nodes in G?, and colors them as the coloring function F of G.
The ?-subgraph G? and its initial coloring meet the conditions of Theorem 7.3.
Intuitively, this means that G? contains all the information regarding the inde-
nite result. Figure 7(b) provides examples of ?-subgraphs.
7.2. Compositional Model Checking
In compositional model checking the goal is to verify a formula ' on a compound
system without ever constructing its full compound model M1jjM2. In our setting
M1 and M2 are Kripke structures that synchronize on the joint labelling of the
states. Since a Kripke structure is a special case of a KMTS where R = R+ = R ,
we dene the composition for the more general case of KMTSs. In the following
we denote by Lit1 and Lit2 the sets of literals over AP1 and AP2, respectively
Denition 7.5 (Composable KMTSs) Two KMTSs M1 = (AP1;S1;s0
1;R
+
1 ;R
 
1 ;L1)
and M2 = (AP2;S2;s0
2;R
+
2 ;R
 
2 ;L2) are composable if their initial states agree
on their joint labeling, i.e. L1(s0
1) \ Lit2 = L2(s0
2) \ Lit1.
Denition 7.6 Let M1 = (AP1;S1;s0
1;R
+
1 ;R
 
1 ;L1) and M2 = (AP2;S2;s0
2;R
+
2 ;R
 
2 ;
L2) be two composable KMTSs. We dene their composition, denoted M1jjM2, to
be the KMTS (AP;S;s0;R+;R ;L), where
 AP = AP1 [ AP2
 S = f(s1;s2) 2 S1  S2 j L1(s1) \ Lit2 = L2(s2) \ Lit1g
 s0 = (s0
1;s0
2)
 R+ = f((s1;s2);(t1;t2)) 2 S  S j (s1;t1) 2 R
+
1 and (s2;t2) 2 R
+
2 g
 R  = f((s1;s2);(t1;t2)) 2 S  S j (s1;t1) 2 R
 
1 and (s2;t2) 2 R
 
2 g
 L((s1;s2)) = L(s1) [ L(s2)
In particular, if M1 and M2 are Kripke structures with transition relations R1 and
R2 respectively, then M1jjM2 is a Kripke structure with R = f((s1;s2);(t1;t2)) 2
S  S j (s1;t1) 2 R1 and (s2;t2) 2 R2g.From now on we x AP to be AP1 [ AP2. For i 2 f1;2g we use i to denote
the remaining index in f1;2g n fig.
We use the mechanism produced for abstractions of full branching time logics
for the purpose of compositional verication. The basic idea is to view each Kripke
structure Mi as a partial model that abstracts M1jjM2.
Denition 7.7 Let Mi = (APi;Si;s0
i;Ri;Li) be a Kripke structure. We lift Mi
into a KMTS Mi"= (AP;Si;s0
i;R
+
i ";R
 
i ";Li") over AP where R
+
i "= ;, R
 
i "= Ri
and Li" (s) = Li(s).
That is, we view Mi as a KMTS Mi" over AP (rather than APi). This immediately
makes the value of each literal over AP n APi in each state of Mi" indenite
(as neither p nor :p are in Li(s)) { indeed, it depends on Mi. In addition, each
transition of Mi is considered a may transition (since in the composition it might
be removed if a matching transition does not exist in Mi, but transitions can
never be added).
Theorem 7.8 M1jjM2  Mi". The mixed simulation is f((s1;s2);si) j (s1;s2) 2
Sg.
Since each Mi" abstracts M1jjM2, we are able to rst consider each component
separately: Theorem 5.3 ensures that if ' has a denite value (tt or ) in Mi"
under the 3-valued semantics, then the same value holds in M1jjM2 as well. In
particular, the values in M1" and M2" cannot be contradictory, and a denite
value in one of them is suces in order to determine the value in M1jjM2.
The more typical case is that the value of ' on both M1" and M2" is inde-
nite. This reects the fact that ' depends on both components and their synchro-
nization. Typically, an indenite result requires some renement of the abstract
model. In our case renement means considering the composition with the other
component. Still, in this case as well, having considered each component sepa-
rately can guide us into focusing on the places where we indeed need to consider
the composition of the components.
The game-based approach to model checking provides a convenient way for
presenting this information. If the KMTS Mi" is model checked using the algo-
rithm of [20] or [23], then the result is a colored game graph, in which T and F
represent denite results (i.e. truth values that hold no matter what the environ-
ment is), but the ? color needs to be resolved by considering the composition.
This is where the ?-subgraph (see Denition 7.4) becomes handy, as it points out
the places where this is really needed.
The ?-subgraph for each component is computed top-down, starting from the
initial node. As long as a node colored ? is encountered, the search continues in a
BFS manner by including the witnessing sons. Denite nodes which are included
in the subgraph become terminal nodes, and their coloring denes the initial
coloring function.
The ?-subgraphs of the two colored graphs present all the indenite informa-
tion that results from the dependencies between the components. Thus, to resolve
the indenite result, we compose the ?-subgraphs.Denition 7.9 (Product Graph) Let G?1 and G?2 be two ?-subgraphs as above
with initial nodes s0
1 ` ' and s0
2 ` ' resp. We dene their product to be the least
graph Gjj = (Njj;n0
jj;E
+
jj ;E
 
jj ) such that:
 n0
jj = (s0
1;s0
2)`' is the initial node in Njj.
 If (s1;s2) `   2 Njj and (s1 `  ;s0
1 `  0) 2 E
 
1 and (s2 `  ;s0
2 `  0) 2 E
 
2
and L1(s0
1)\Lit2 = L2(s0
2)\Lit1 (i.e. (s0
1;s0
2) is a state of M1jjM2), then:
(s0
1;s0
2)` 0 2 Njj and ((s1;s2)` ;(s0
1;s0
2)` 0) is in E
+
jj and E
 
jj .
Note that all the edges in Gjj are must edges, whereas in the ?-subgraphs we
had may edges (the transitions of each component were treated as may transitions
in the lifted version). This is because the product graph already refers to the
complete system M1jjM2, where all transitions are concrete transitions (modeled
as must transitions).
The product graph is constructed by a top-down traversal of the subgraphs,
where, starting from the initial nodes, nodes that share the same formulas and
whose states agree on the joint labeling are composed (recall that s0
1 and s0
2
agree on their joint labeling). Whenever two non-terminal nodes are composed,
the outgoing edges are computed as the product of their outgoing edges, limited
to legal nodes (w.r.t. the restriction to states that agree on their labeling). In
particular, this means that if a node in one subgraph has no matching node in
the other, then it will be omitted from the product graph. In addition, when a
terminal node of one subgraph is composed with a non-terminal node of the other,
the resulting node is a terminal node in Gjj.
We accompany Gjj with an initial coloring function for its terminal nodes
based on the initial coloring functions of the two subgraphs. We use the following
observation:
Proposition 7.10 Let n = (s1;s2) `   be a terminal node in Gjj. Then one of
the following holds. Either (a) at least one of s1 `   and s2 `   is a terminal
node in its subgraph, in which case at least one of them is colored with a denite
color by the initial coloring of its subgraph, and contradictory denite colors are
impossible. We denote this color by col(n); Or (b) both s1 `   and s2 `   are
non-terminal nodes but no outgoing edges were left in their composition.
Denition 7.11 We dene the initial coloring function I of Gjj as follows. Let n
be a terminal node in Njj. If it fullls case (a) of Prop. 7.10, then I(n) = col(n).
If it fullls case (b), then I(n) = T if n is a ^-node or a 2-node, and I(n) = F
if n is a _-node or a }-node. I is undened for the rest of the nodes.
In particular, if a terminal node in Gjj results from a terminal node which
is colored by ? in one subgraph and a terminal node which is colored by some
denite color in the other, then the denite color takes over.
Note that the initial coloring function of the product graph colors all the
terminal nodes by denite colors. Along with the property that all the edges in
the product graph are must edges, this reects the fact that the composition
resolves all the indenite information that existed in each component when it was
considered separately. Therefore, when applying (one of) the coloring algorithm tothe product graph, all the nodes are colored by denite colors (in fact, a 2-valued
coloring can be applied).
Theorem 7.12 The resulting product graph Gjj is a closed subgraph of the game
graph over M1jjM2. In addition, the initial coloring function is correct w.r.t.
M1jjM2 and dened over all the terminal nodes in the subgraph.
By Theorem 7.3, this means that coloring Gjj results in a correct result with
respect to the model checking of ' in M1jjM2. Thus, to model check ' on M1jjM2
it remains to color the product graph Gjj. Note that the full graph for M1jjM2 is
not constructed. To sum up, the algorithm is as follows.
Step 1 Model check each Mi" separately (for i 2 f1;2g):
1. Construct the game graph Gi for ' and Mi".
2. Apply the 3-valued coloring on Gi.
Let i be the resulting coloring function.
If 1(n0
1) or 2(n0
2) is denite, return the corresponding
model checking result for M1jjM2.
Step 2 Consider the composition M1jjM2:
1. Construct the ?-subgraphs for G1 and G2.
2. Construct the product graph Gjj of the ?-subgraphs.
3. Apply the 3-valued coloring on Gjj
(with the initial coloring function).
Return the model checking result corresponding to jj(n0
jj).
Example 7.1 Consider the components depicted in Figure 7(a). The atomic
proposition o (short for output) is local to M1, i (input) is local to M2, and r
(receive) is the only joint atomic proposition that M1 and M2 synchronize on.
Suppose we wish to verify in M1jjM2 the property 2(:i_}o), which states that in
all the successor states of the initial state, an input signal implies that there is a
successor state where the output signal holds. Figure 7(b) depicts the colored game
graph of each (lifted) component, and highlights the ?-subgraph of each of them.
The product graph and its coloring is depicted in Figure 7(c), as an \intersection"
of the two subgraphs. All the edges in the product graph are must edges. All nodes,
and in particular the initial node, are colored T, thus the property is veried. One
can see that most of the eorts were done on each component separately, and the
product graph only considers a small part of the compound system.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we describe two frameworks for abstraction-renement in model
checking. While having similar general ow of abstract-check-rene, the details ofG1::
s0 `:i _ }o
s0 `}o
s0 `o s2 `o
s1 `:i _ }o
s1 `}o
s0 `(:i _ }o)
s1 `o
s0 `:i s1 `:i
G2::
t1 `:i _ }o
t2 `:i t1 `:i t2 `}o
t0 `(:i _ }o)
t0 `:i _ }o
t0 `o t1 `o t2 `o
t2 `:i _ }o
t1 `}o t0 `:i t0 `}o
(b)
:r;:o
r;o r;:o
s0
s2 s1
M1::
:i;:r
:i;r i;r
t0
t1 t2
M2::
(a)
(s0;t0)`(:i _ }o)
(s2;t1)`o
(s1;t1)`}o
(s1;t1)`:i _ }o
(c)
Figure 7. (a) Components, (b) their game graphs and their ?-subgraphs (enclosed by a line), and
(c) the product graph. Dashed edges denote may edges which are not must edges. The colors
reect the coloring function: white stands for T, dark gray stands for F and light gray stands
for ?.
the two frameworks are quite dierent. One is based on the 2-valued semantics for
temporal logics. It may return false negative results since the abstraction does not
distinguish between the case where the checked property is violated and the case
where information is lacking. As a result, the goal of renement is to eliminate
spurious counterexamples.
The other framework is based on the 3-valued semantics. It identies the case
where information is lacking and returns then an indenite result. It thus never
returns false negative or false positive. The renement in this case is aimed at
eliminating indenite results.
For a given set of abstract states, model checking the 3-valued abstract model
will return more precise results more often. It is therefore worth the extra cost
of constructing a KMTS rather than a Kripke structure as an abstract model. In
[37] and [39], suggestions are made on how to reduce this extra cost while still
benet from the additional precision.
We demonstrate how the 3-valued abstraction-renement framework can be
exploited in order to obtain a fully automatic compositional technique. The com-
positional approach we present is signicantly dierent from other compositional
approaches, which are mostly based on the Assume-Guarantee reasoning.
Other applications of 3-valued abstractions have been applied successfully in
dierent contexts. One example is the Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (STE) [34]
which combines symbolic simulation with 3-valued abstraction. It is capable of
verifying and refuting huge circuits with respect to simple LTL specications.
However, it sometimes returns an indenite value (denoted there by X) to indicate
that the abstraction is too coarse to determine if the specication holds. In this
case a renement of the abstraction is applied [40,7] by replacing some of the X
values on circuit inputs with symbolic variables.X-BMC [41] is another successful application of 3-valued abstraction to hard-
ware verication. It introduces X to the circuit inputs, thus eliminating parts of
the circuit that are irrelevant to the checked property. It can handle any property
expressed by an !-regular language. An application of 3-valued abstraction to
software is presented in [24].
All of the above demonstrates the power of 3-valued abstraction which can
signicantly enhance the model checking technology. Further research is needed
in order to extend its use to other applications.
Acknowledgement: Sharon Shoham is thanked for signi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